Αναρτήθηκε από τον/την satyrikon στο Ιανουαρίου 31, 2009
Israel's President Shimon Peres, right, looks on as Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan makes a point while speaking during a session at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Thursday Jan. 29, 2009. (AP Photo/Michel Euler)
Ο ΠΡΩΘΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ ΞΙΦΟΥΛΚΗΣΕ ΣΤΟ ΝΤΑΒΟΣ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΙΣΡΑΗΛ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΓΚΛΗΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΘΕΣΗ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΩΝ ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΙΝΙΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΓΑΖΑΣ.
ΒΕΒΑΙΑ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΜΕΙΩΣΕΙ ΤΙΣ ΠΑΡΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΕΣ ΤΩΝ ΛΕΟΝΤΑΡΙΣΜΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΙΣΧΥΡΙΣΤΗΚΕ ΟΤΙ Η ΕΠΙΘΕΣΗ ΤΟΥΔΕΝ ΑΦΟΡΟΥΣΕ ΣΤΟΝ ΛΑΟ ΤΟΥ ΙΣΡΑΗΛ Ή ΤΟΥΣ ΕΒΡΑΙΟΥΣ.
ΟΙ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΟΕΒΡΑΙΟΙ ΥΠΟΔΕΧΤΗΚΑΝ ΤΙΣ ΔΗΛΩΣΕΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΜΕ ΕΝΤΟΝΗ ΚΡΙΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΦΑΝΕΡΟ ΟΤΙ ΟΙ ΣΥΝΕΠΕΙΕΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ ΔΕΝ ΘΑ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΑΜΕΛΗΤΕΕΣ.
Η ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΙΚΗ ΠΡΕΣΒΕΙΑ ΣΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΙΣΕ ΤΟ ΓΕΓΟΝΟΣ ΣΑΝ “ΑΤΥΧΕΣ” ΚΑΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΣΥΝΕΧΕΙΑ ΑΝΑΒΛΗΘΗΚΕ Η ΕΠΙΣΚΕΨΗ ΤΟΥ ΑΠΕΣΤΑΛΜΕΝΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΟΜΠΑΜΑ,ΜΙΤΣΕΛ ΣΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΕΧΝΙΚΟΥ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ.
ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΑΛΛΗ ΜΕΡΙΑ Ο ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΟΣ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ ΔΗΛΩΝΕΙ ΜΕ ΣΑΦΗΝΕΙΑ ΟΤΙ “ΤΑ ΕΘΝΙΚΑ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΩΤΗ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΑΙΟΤΗΤΑ ΣΤΙΣ ΔΙΠΛΩΜΑΤΙΚΕΣ ΣΧΕΣΕΙΣ”.
Η ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΦΟΡΑ ΤΟΥ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΥ ΠΡΩΘΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΥ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΙΣΡΑΗΛ ΔΕΝ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙ ΚΕΡΑΥΝΟ ΕΝ ΑΙΘΡΙΑ.
ΟΙ ΣΧΕΣΕΙΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΙΣΡΑΗΛ ΜΕΧΡΙ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΕΥΡΙΣΚΟΝΤΟ ΣΕ ΥΨΗΛΟ ΕΠΙΠΕΔΟ ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ.
Note: The following map was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters. It was published in the Armed Forces Journal in June 2006, Peters is a retired colonel of the U.S. National War Academy. (Map Copyright Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters 2006). Although the map does not officially reflect Pentagon doctrine, it has been used in a training program at NATO's Defense College for senior military officers. This map, as well as other similar maps, has most probably been used at the National War Academy as well as in military planning circles.
ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΙΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΚΟΥΡΔΙΚΟΥ ΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ Η ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ ΑΝΤΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΤΑΙ ΟΤΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΑΜΕΝΕΙ ΜΕΙΩΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΘΝΙΚΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΔΑΦΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΓΙΑ ΑΥΤΟ ΤΑ ΠΑΙΖΕΙ ΠΛΕΟΝ ΟΛΑ ΓΙΑ ΟΛΑ.
ΠΑΙΖΕΙ ΤΟ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΧΑΡΤΙ ΠΡΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΥ ΝΑ ΑΠΟΦΥΓΕΙ ΜΕ ΤΙΣ ΛΙΓΩΤΕΡΕΣ ΑΠΩΛΕΙΕΣ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΑΜΕΝΟΜΕΝΗ ΕΘΝΙΚΗ ΤΗΣ ΗΤΤΑ Ή ΚΑΙ ΝΑ ΚΕΡΔΙΣΕ ΕΔΑΦΟΣ ΣΤΟ ΑΙΓΑΙΟ ΣΕ ΒΑΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ ΩΣΤΕ ΝΑ ΑΠΑΛΥΝΘΕΙ Η ΗΤΤΑ ΤΗΣ.
ΕΞΟΥ ΚΑΙ Η ΕΝΤΕΙΝΟΜΕΝΗ ΕΠΙΘΕΤΙΚΗ ΔΡΑΣΤΗΡΙΟΤΗΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ ΠΟΥ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΣΣΕΤΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΟ ΚΑΙΡΟ -ΜΕ ΠΟΙΟΤΙΚΗ ΑΝΟΔΟ-ΣΤΟ ΑΙΓΑΙΟ ΣΕ ΒΑΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ.
ΒΕΒΑΙΑ Η ΗΡΩΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΕΡΝΤΟΓΑΝ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΥΣ, ΤΟΥΣ ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΙΝΙΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΓΕΝΙΚΩΤΕΡΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥΣ ΜΟΥΣΟΥΛΜΑΝΟΥΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΟ ΠΑΡΕΠΟΜΕΝΟ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΠΟΥ ΣΤΟΧΕΥΕΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΝΑΔΕΙΞΗ ΤΗΣ ΣΑΝ ΗΓΕΤΙΚΗΣ ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑΚΗΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΜΟΥΣΟΥΛΜΑΝΙΚΟΥ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ ΣΕ ΑΝΤΙΒΑΡΟ ΤΗΣ ΙΡΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΕΠΙΡΡΟΗΣ.
ΒΕΒΑΙΑ ΤΟ ΠΙΟ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΟ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΤΙ Ο ΕΡΝΤΟΓΑΝ ΓΥΡΙΣΕ ΜΕ ΑΔΕΙΑ ΧΕΡΙΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΙΣ ΔΙΑΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΥΣΕΙΣ ΠΟΥ ΕΙΧΕ ΜΕ ΤΟ ΔΙΕΘΝΕΣ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΟ ΤΑΜΕΙΟ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΔΑΝΕΙΟΔΟΤΗΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ ΑΠΟ ΑΥΤΟ.
ΕΠΙΣΗΣ ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΣΗΜΕΙΩΘΕΙ ΚΑΙ Η ΑΠΟΤΥΧΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΑΣΚΕΨΗΣ ΠΟΥ ΕΓΙΝΕ ΣΤΗΝ ΒΟΥΔΑΠΕΣΤΗ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΥΛΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΑΓΩΓΟΥ ΦΥΣΙΚΟΥ ΑΕΡΙΟΥ ΝΑΜΠΟΥΚΟ, ΜΕΣΩ ΤΟΥ ΟΠΟΙΟΥ Η ΑΓΚΥΡΑ ΕΚΒΙΑΖΕΙ ΤΟΣΟ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΕΥ ΟΡΩΝ ΕΙΣΔΟΧΗ ΤΗΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΙΚΗ ΕΝΩΣΗ ΟΣΟ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΓΙΩΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΣΑΝ ΧΩΡΑ ΤΡΟΦΟΔΟΤΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΗΣ ΜΕ ΦΥΣΙΚΟ ΑΕΡΙΟ
The Bush years are over. Obama’s inaugural address could not have made the ending more stark, with repeated lines signaling a new direction and offering veiled but unmistakable indictments of what the 44th president called a “failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age.”
ΤΗΣ Η AJC-ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΟΙΟΥΔΑΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ-ΣΕ ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ ΜΕ
ΤΟ ΚΙΣ-ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΟ ΙΣΡΑΗΛΙΤΙΚΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟ-ΠΙΕΖΕΙ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΚΑΤΑΔΙΚΗ
ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΘΡΗΣΚΕΥΤΙΚΟΥΣ ΗΓΕΤΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΡΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΠΟΥ ΑΣΚΕΙΤΑΙ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΤΟΥ ΙΣΡΑΗΛ ΓΙΑ ΤΑ ΕΓΚΛΗΜΑΤΑ ΠΟΥ ΔΙΑΠΡΑΤΤΕΙ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΛΑΟΥ ΤΩΝ ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΙΝΙΩΝ.
ΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑ ΖΗΤΑΕΙ ΝΑ ΕΠΙΚΡΟΤΗΣΟΥΝ ΤΟ ΛΟΥΤΡΟ ΑΙΜΑΤΟΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΓΑΖΑ ΚΑΙ ΤOΝ ΦΡΙΚΤΟ ΘΑΝΑΤΟ ΧΙΛΙΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΛΕΟΝ
New York, NY, January 22, 2009 … The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) today called on leaders of several European countries to publicly condemn “the explosion of anti-Semitic rhetoric” and posters and banners with Nazi imagery and Holocaust comparisons seen and heard at anti-Israel demonstrations since the outbreak of hostilities in Gaza.
Αναρτήθηκε από τον/την satyrikon στο Ιανουαρίου 15, 2009
ΚΑΙ ΓΙΑΤΙ ΤΩΡΑ?
Η Standard & Poor’s ΥΠΟΒΑΘΜΙΣΕ ΤΗΝ ΠΙΣΤΟΛΗΠΤΙΚΗ ΙΚΑΝΟΤΗΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ ΤΗΝ ΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΗ ΕΒΔΟΜΑΔΑ ΜΑΖΙ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΙΡΛΑΝΔΙΑ. ΕΠΙΣΗΣ ΥΠΟΒΑΘΜΙΣΕ ΑΡΝΗΤΙΚΑ ΟΜΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΡΤΟΓΑΛΙΑ ΠΡΟΚΑΛΩΝΤΑΣ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΤΙΔΡΑΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΡΤΟΓΑΛΟΥ ΠΡΩΘΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΥ Ο ΟΠΟΙΟΣ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΙΣΕ “UNFAIR” ΤΗΝ ΚΙΝΗΣΗ ΑΥΤΗ ΤΗΣ Standard & Poor’s.
ΑΣ ΔΟΥΜΕ ΟΜΩΣ ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ Η Standard & Poor’s ΚΑΙ ΤΙ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΑ ΕΞΥΠΗΡΕΤΕΙ ΕΝ ΜΕΣΩ ΤΗΣ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΑΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΚΡΙΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΙΣΡΑΗΛΙΝΗΣ ΕΠΙΔΡΟΜΗΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΓΑΖΑ.
ΤΙ ΣΧΕΣΗ ΕΧΕΙ ΑΡΑΓΕ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΗ ΠΥΡΟΜΑΧΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΡΝΗΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΗΣ ΝΑ ΤΟ ΕΠΙΤΡΕΨΕΙ?
ΔΙΑΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΣΧΕΣΕΩΝ ΤΗΣ Standard & Poor’s
SUBSIDIARY ΤΗΣ Standard & Poor’s H MacGraw-Hill Companies Inc.
ΟΠΟΥ ΕΜΦΑΝΙΖΕΤΑΙ Ο JOHN NEGROPONTE ΩΣ EVP ΚΑΙ H CIA TO CFR KAI O BUSH KAΘΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ STATE DEPARTMENT.
FM 3-05.130
Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to
protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 28 August 2008. Other requests for this document
must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,
ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by e-mail to JAComments@soc.mil.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
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Foreign Disclosure Restriction (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers in
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i
Field Manual
No. 3-05.130
Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 30 September 2008
Army Special Operations Forces
Unconventional Warfare
Contents
Page
PREFACE………………………………………………………………………………………………..iv
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………… 1-1
Overview………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1-1
Unconventional Warfare …………………………………………………………………………. 1-2
Conventional Warfare…………………………………………………………………………….. 1-4
Irregular Warfare …………………………………………………………………………………… 1-5
Chapter 2 UNITED STATES NATIONAL POWER……………………………………………………. 2-1
The International Environment ………………………………………………………………… 2-1
Instruments of United States National Power…………………………………………….. 2-1
The Effectiveness of Integrated National Power ………………………………………. 2-14
Chapter 3 POLICY AND DOCTRINE………………………………………………………………………. 3-1
National Policy………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-1
Conventional Warfare and Major Combat Operations ………………………………. 3-15
Irregular Warfare …………………………………………………………………………………. 3-21
Chapter 4 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS…………………………………………………………….. 4-1
Unconventional Warfare Planning……………………………………………………………. 4-1
Seven Phases of Unconventional Warfare………………………………………………… 4-5
Unconventional Warfare Termination of Operations …………………………………. 4-12
Army Special Operations Forces……………………………………………………………. 4-14
Supporting Elements and Activities………………………………………………………… 4-20
Interagency Activities……………………………………………………………………………. 4-20
Contents
ii FM 3-05.130 30 September 2008
Chapter 5 SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS…………………………………………………………. 5-1
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………… 5-1
Phase I: Preparation………………………………………………………………………………. 5-1
Phase II: Initial Contact…………………………………………………………………………… 5-2
Phase III: Infiltration……………………………………………………………………………….. 5-2
Phase IV: Organization…………………………………………………………………………… 5-3
Phase V: Buildup…………………………………………………………………………………… 5-6
Phase VI: Employment …………………………………………………………………………… 5-7
Phase VII: Transition ……………………………………………………………………………… 5-8
Chapter 6 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS …………………………………………………………. 6-1
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………… 6-1
Phase I: Preparation………………………………………………………………………………. 6-1
Phase II: Initial Contact…………………………………………………………………………… 6-4
Phase III: Infiltration……………………………………………………………………………….. 6-5
Phase IV: Organization…………………………………………………………………………… 6-6
Phase V: Buildup…………………………………………………………………………………… 6-9
Phase VI: Employment …………………………………………………………………………. 6-11
Phase VII: Transition ……………………………………………………………………………. 6-12
Chapter 7 CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS………………………………………………………………. 7-1
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………… 7-1
Phase I: Preparation………………………………………………………………………………. 7-1
Phase II: Initial Contact…………………………………………………………………………… 7-3
Phase III: Infiltration……………………………………………………………………………….. 7-4
Phase IV: Organization…………………………………………………………………………… 7-5
Phase V: Buildup…………………………………………………………………………………… 7-6
Phase VI: Employment …………………………………………………………………………… 7-6
Phase VII: Transition ……………………………………………………………………………. 7-10
Chapter 8 SUPPORTING ELEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES …………………………………………. 8-1
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………… 8-1
Communications Support ……………………………………………………………………….. 8-1
Logistics Support …………………………………………………………………………………… 8-5
Force Health Protection………………………………………………………………………….. 8-8
Aviation Support ………………………………………………………………………………….. 8-11
Appendix A THE DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER……………………….A-1
Appendix B THE INFORMATIONAL INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER………………..B-1
Appendix C THE INTELLIGENCE INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER……………………C-1
Appendix D THE ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER …………………………D-1
Appendix E THE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER…………………………. E-1
Appendix F THE LAW ENFORCEMENT INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER…………. F-1
Appendix G THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER ……………………………G-1
Appendix H THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND CULTURE ……………………………………………….H-1
Appendix I A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE …………………. I-1
Appendix J AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
DEFINITION …………………………………………………………………………………………. J-1
Contents
30 September 2008 FM 3-05.130 iii
GLOSSARY ………………………………………………………………………………Glossary-1
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………….References-1
INDEX……………………………………………………………………………………………. Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Contrasting conventional and irregular warfare ……………………………………………1-7
Figure 1-2. Principles of major combat operations………………………………………………………..1-8
Figure 1-3. Joint operating concept relationships………………………………………………………….1-9
Figure 2-1. The intelligence process …………………………………………………………………………..2-5
Figure 4-1. Classic components of an insurgency in an unconventional warfare
operational area ……………………………………………………………………………………..4-8
Figure 6-1. Psychological Operations and Special Forces Soldiers building rapport
with an unconventional warfare force in Afghanistan …………………………………..6-6
Figure 6-2. Afghan village elder addressing population on Psychological Operations
loudspeaker……………………………………………………………………………………………6-8
Figure 7-1. Civil-military lines of operation in support of unconventional warfare………………7-2
Figure 7-2. Active Army Civil Affairs battalion operational structure ………………………………..7-3
Figure 7-3. Civil Affairs core tasks in support of civil-military operations ………………………….7-4
Figure 7-4. Sample checklist for transition planning…………………………………………………….7-11
Figure A-1. Organizations grouping almost all countries in their respective continents………A-7
Figure A-2. Several smaller regional organizations with nonoverlapping memberships……..A-8
Figure A-3. Several nonoverlapping large alliances………………………………………………………A-8
Figure B-1. The information environment …………………………………………………………………….B-2
Figure B-2. Information quality criteria ………………………………………………………………………..B-2
Tables
Table B-1. Information operations integration into joint operations………………………………. B-20
ΔΕΙΓΜΑΤΑ ΓΡΑΦΗΣ
1-21. Waging protracted IW depends on building global capability and capacity. IW will not be won by the United States alone but rather through combined efforts with multinational partners. Combined IW [Irregular Warfare, euphemism for TERRORISM] will require the joint force to establish a long-term sustained presence in numerous countries to build partner capability and capacity. This capability and capacity extends U.S. operational reach, multiplies forces available, and provides increased options for defeating adversaries. The constituent activities of IW are:
Insurgency.
COIN.
UW.
Terrorism
CT.
FID.
Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
Strategic communication (SC).
PSYOP.
Civil-military operations (CMO).
Information operations (IO).
Intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) activities.
Transnational criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions that support or sustain IW.
Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries.
1-22. The above list of operations and activities can be conducted within IW;
@@@@@
Personnel should not confuse UW with other operations that involve indigenous
personnel, such as FID. The United States characterizes FID as an overt, direct
method of assistance to free and protect a host nation (HN) government from
insurgency or lawlessness. Forces conduct FID with recognized HN regular forces.
These forces are armed individuals or groups of individuals who are members of the
regular armed force, police force, or other internal security force of that nation. There
may be instances in which the United States or the HN overtly employs civilian
personnel to enhance operational effectiveness; however, those personnel are
openly recognized as an augmentation to the regular forces of the HN.
Army and joint doctrine currently do not define regulars, or regular forces. For use in
this manual, these forces are defined as being opposite of irregular forces. Regulars
are armed individuals or groups of individuals who are members of a regular armed
force, police, or other internal security force. Once a nation charters or sponsors a
force to provide internal security, that force is considered to be a regular force.
Regardless of its appearance or naming convention, if the force operates under
governmental control, it is a regular force.
Irregulars, or irregular forces, are individuals or groups of individuals who are not
members of a regular armed force, police, or other internal security force. They are
usually nonstate-sponsored and unconstrained by sovereign nation legalities and
boundaries. These forces may include, but are not limited to, specific paramilitary
forces, contractors, individuals, businesses, foreign political organizations, resistance
or insurgent organizations, expatriates, transnational terrorism adversaries,
disillusioned transnational terrorism members, black marketers, and other social or
political “undesirables.”
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Chapter 1
1-8 FM 3-05.130 30 September 2008
be conducted as an IW element in support of what is predominantly a conventional military operation. The
emerging IW concept borrows heavily from traditional ARSOF concepts, but they are not synonymous.
Doctrinal Terms and Definitions
Conventional or traditional warfare: A form of warfare between states that employs
direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an
adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a
change in an adversary’s government or policies. The focus of conventional military
operations is normally an adversary’s armed forces with the objective of influencing
the adversary’s government. It generally assumes that the indigenous populations
within the operational area are nonbelligerents and will accept whatever political
outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A fundamental
military objective in conventional military operations is to minimize civilian
interference in those operations. (IW JOC, V1.0)
Irregular warfare: A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy
and influence over the relevant populations. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of
the United States)
Unconventional warfare: Operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in
support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military
operations. (FM 3-05.201)
Foreign internal defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a
government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other
designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency. (JP 1-02; FM 3-05.137, Army Special Operations Forces Foreign
Internal Defense)
Counterinsurgency: Those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological,
and civil actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. (JP 1-02; FM 3-24,
